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Contents May Have Shifted:
Disentangling the Best Evidence Rule
from the Rule Against Hearsay
Colin Miller*
Abstract
The rule against hearsay covers a statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted but does not cover a statement
offered for another purpose. Meanwhile, the Best Evidence Rule
states that a party seeking to prove the content of a writing,
recording, or photograph must produce the original or account for
its nonproduction. Does this mean that the Rule is inapplicable
when a party seeks to prove something other than the truth of the
matter asserted in a writing, recording or photograph? Most
courts have answered this question in the affirmative. This essay
argues these courts are wrong.
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I. Introduction
In a divorce action in which a husband and wife vigorously
argue over the distribution of marital assets and custody of their
children, the wife seeks to testify that she read a torn-up printout
of an e-mail sent from her husband to the wife’s sister.1 In the
e-mail, the husband allegedly professes his love for his wife’s
sister and his plan to divorce his wife and rendezvous with the
sister.2 The husband’s attorney responds that the e-mail contains
inadmissible hearsay and that testimony concerning the e-mail
would violate the Best Evidence Rule because the wife failed to
perform a diligent search for the email.3 According to the wife’s
attorney, the purpose of the wife’s testimony is not to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the e-mail: that the husband was
actually in love with the sister.4 Instead, the wife’s testimony
would prove the effect of the e-mail on the wife’s state of mind
and explain why the wife left her husband in Sudan and returned
to the United States with the couple’s children.5
The trial court deems the wife’s testimony admissible, and
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals later agrees, finding
that the explanation given by the wife’s attorney killed two birds
with one stone: First, the wife’s testimony about the e-mail did
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Associate Professor,
University of South Carolina School of Law; Blog Editor, EvidenceProf Blog:
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/.
1. See Abulqasim v. Mahmoud, 49 A.3d 828, 837 (D.C. 2012) (finding no
abuse of discretion when a trial court admitted testimony regarding the content
of an email that was not itself introduced into evidence).
2. See id. (paraphrasing defendant Mahmoud’s testimony regarding the
email’s contents).
3. See id.
Abulqasim argues that Mahmoud failed to satisfy her burden of
proving that she performed a “diligent search for the email,” and that
her only explanation—that she “ha[d] a whole lot of stuff
stolen . . . from [her] while [she] was in Sudan . . . and [she] believe[d]
one of them [wa]s the email”—was insufficient.
4. See id. (“In admitting Mahmoud’s testimony concerning the email, the
court recognized that testimony about the contents of the writing was hearsay,
but ruled that it was not being admitted to prove the truth of a romantic
relationship between Abulqasim and his sister-in-law.”).
5. See id. at 837–38 (“The court exercised reasonable discretion by
admitting the testimony as evidence only to the extent it explained Mahmoud’s
actions . . . .”).
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not violate the rule against hearsay because it merely “explained
[the wife]’s actions and” was not admitted to prove “‘the truth of
the matter asserted’—the matter asserted being that [the
husband] and [the wife’s sister] were having a romantic
relationship.”6 Second, immediately after this statement, the
court concludes that, for the same reason, “the best evidence rule
did not apply.”7 In other words, like many courts before it, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia conflates the rule
against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule, finding neither rule
implicated by the admission of evidence concerning a statement
offered to prove something other than the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.8 This Essay contends that this
conflation reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the Best
Evidence Rule and that courts must disentangle that Rule from
the rule against hearsay and find the Best Evidence Rule
implicated whenever a party seeks to prove the content of a
statement, a concept distinct from the truth of the matter
asserted in a statement.
II. The Rule Against Hearsay and the Truth of the Matter
Asserted
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines “hearsay” as a
statement that:
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current
trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.9

In turn, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 deems hearsay
inadmissible in the absence of an exclusion, exception, or federal
statute.10 Rule 802 deems hearsay evidence presumptively
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (noting that most federal
and state courts in similar cases have conflated the rule against hearsay and the
Best Evidence Rule).
9. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
10. FED. R. EVID. 802.
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inadmissible both because such evidence is unreliable and
because the jury has an inability to assess that unreliability at
trial. As the Supreme Court explained in Williamson v. United
States,11 Rule 802:
[I]s premised on the theory that out-of-court statements are
subject to particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he
might have misperceived the events which he relates; he
might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood
or taken out of context by the listener. And the ways in which
these dangers are minimized for in-court statements—the
oath, the witness’[s] awareness of the gravity of the
proceedings, the jury’s ability to observe the witness’
demeanor, and, most importantly, the right of the opponent to
cross-examine—are generally absent for things said out of
court.12

Essentially, Rule 802 recognizes that the relevance of
hearsay evidence depends upon two characteristics that the jury
cannot adequately assess: the honesty and accuracy of the
declarant when he made the subject statement.13 Imagine a case
in which Dan is prosecuted for murdering Vince. Ed, an alleged
eyewitness, told his friend Fred that he saw Dan shoot Vince, and
the prosecution wants to call Fred to testify concerning Ed’s
statement. Ed’s statement is only relevant to prove Dan’s guilt if
Ed was being both honest and accurate when he made the
statement. If Ed was lying in that he actually saw Carl shoot
Vince, the statement would not tend to prove that Dan murdered
Vince. Similarly, if Ed was inaccurate in that he thought that he
saw Dan shoot Vince when it was in fact Carl who shot Vince, his
statement would also lack relevance.
If Ed takes the witness stand at trial and testifies that he
saw Dan shoot Vince, the jury can assess his credibility after he
takes the oath and is subjected to the crucible of cross-

11.
12.
13.

512 U.S. 594 (1994).
Id. at 598.
See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 8:3 (4th ed. 2013) (noting these as two of the primary reasons why
hearsay evidence is typically inadmissible); cf. State v. Walker, No. 1461, 1977
WL 198855, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1977) (noting that the “official reports”
exception to the rule against hearsay is premised upon the habit of honesty and
accuracy of public officials in the performance of their duties).
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examination.14 Conversely, if Ed’s statement were merely
admitted through the testimony of Fred, the jurors would have to
rely upon Fred’s assessment of Ed’s credibility when Ed made the
statement rather than being able to draw their own conclusions,
which is why Fred’s testimony is precluded by the rule against
hearsay.15
This analysis in turn explains why Rule 801(c)(2)
circumscribes the definition of hearsay so that it only covers a
statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement.”16 If a party is not seeking to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in a statement, then the jury need not be
concerned with the honesty and accuracy of the declarant when
he made the subject statement.
Imagine a different case in which Vince has brought a civil
battery action against Dan based upon a physical encounter
between the two men. Dan claims that he was acting in selfdefense and wants to testify at trial that Ed told him minutes
before the encounter, “Vince is coming to see you to collect on that
drug debt that you owe him.” If Dan is offering this statement to
prove that Vince was in fact coming to see him to collect on the
drug debt, the statement is classic hearsay as it is a statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.17 Indeed, if we
assume that Ed’s statement must be based upon someone—likely
Vince—telling him about Vince’s plan to collect on the drug debt,
then the statement is hearsay within hearsay.18

14. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (finding that the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment “commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination”).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Campanaro, 63 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. Pa.
1945) (“The vice of such evidence is that the other person upon whose credibility
the jury must rely is not present in court and cannot be subjected to crossexamination.”).
16. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
17. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that . . . the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing[,]
and . . . a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement.”).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 805 (“Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the
rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an
exception to the rule.”).
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On the other hand, Dan could legitimately argue that he is
offering the statement not to prove the truth of the matter
asserted but to prove its effect on the listener, making it not
hearsay.19 Specifically, Dan could claim that he is offering the
statement to prove that, regardless of whether Ed was being
honest or accurate when he made the statement, Dan had every
reason to believe the statement, placing him in reasonable
apprehension of Vince.20
In this sense, Dan’s testimony would be no different than if
Dan were to testify that he heard some other non-hearsay sound
such as a dog barking or a doorbell ringing. The barking and the
ringing are not hearsay because neither is a statement made by a
person, and Dan could not call the dog or the doorbell to the
witness stand to have the jury assess their credibility.21 Instead,
the only question with such testimony would be whether Dan
actually heard the dog barking or the doorbell ringing, making
the admissibility of his testimony a question of personal
knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence 60222 and not a
hearsay question under Rule 802.23 If it is irrelevant to the jury
whether Ed was being honest and/or accurate when he made the
subject statement, then Ed is the functional equivalent of the dog
or the alarm clock, and there is no reason to call him to the
witness stand. This is why courts regularly say that a statement

19. See, e.g., United States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2013)
(noting that “a statement offered to show its effect on the listener is not
hearsay”).
20. See, e.g., State v. Silveira, 503 A.2d 599, 609 (Conn. 1986) (“If offered to
show his reasonable apprehension of danger it is not offered for a hearsay
purpose; its value for this purpose does not depend on the truth of the
statement.” (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 231, at 734 (Edward W. Cleary
ed., 3d ed. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21. See Colin Miller, Hear Spot Bark: Washington Court of Appeals Rejects
Argument That Dog Barking Constitutes Hearsay, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG, (Nov.
15, 2007), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2007/11/hear-spotbark-.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2014) (discussing “animal hearsay”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter.”).
23. See FED R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note (noting that a witness
may testify to a fact that he or she actually observed).
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is not hearsay if the only question is “whether the statement was
made [and] not whether it was true.”24
Another type of statement that is not hearsay because the
sole concern is whether the statement was made is a statement of
independent legal significance.25 One classic example of such a
statement is a contract, which “is a verbal act.”26 Assume that
Paul offers Dennis $500 if Dennis paints Paul’s house, and
Dennis accepts Paul’s offer. If Paul later sues Dennis for breach
of contract, Paul can testify concerning Dennis’s acceptance
without regard to the rule against hearsay because Paul is not
seeking to prove the truth of the matter asserted: that Dennis
actually intended to paint the house. When Dan agreed to Paul’s
offer, he could have had every intention or no intention at all to
paint the house, and it would not have mattered: When Dennis
stated that he accepted Paul’s offer, it created a legally binding
contract, regardless of what Dennis might have been thinking to
himself.27
A final type of statement that is not hearsay because the only
concern is whether the statement was made is a statement
offered to impeach a witness. Imagine in the prior example that
Paul later sought to sell his house and had a realtor, Regina, over
to look at his house while his neighbor, Ned, was present. At that
time, Regina told Paul and Ned that the paint on his house
looked fine and that it should not be a hindrance to Paul in
selling his house. Thereafter, when Paul sues Dennis for breach
of contract, Paul calls Regina to testify that one of the main
reasons that Paul’s house had not sold and was still on the
market was that the paint on his house looked terrible. If Dennis
calls Ned to testify to Regina’s earlier statement, he could argue
that he is offering the statement for a legitimate non-hearsay
24. Gleason v. Smolinski, No. NNHCV065005107S, 2012 WL 3871999, at
*12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012).
25. See, e.g., Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527,
540 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Signed instruments such as wills, contracts, and
promissory notes are writings that have independent legal significance, and are
nonhearsay.” (quoting THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES
180 (2d ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. Id.
27. See id. (“Under the objective theory of contracts, the fact that two
parties signed a contract is enough to create legal rights, whatever the
signatories might have been thinking when they signed it.”).
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purpose: to impeach Regina’s testimony by revealing to the jury
the inconsistency between that testimony and her prior
statement.28 Such impeachment is permissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 613 and is not hearsay under Rule 801 because
it is offered to attack the credibility of the witness and not to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the prior statement:
that the paint on the house actually looked fine.29
III. The Best Evidence Rule and Proving the Content of a Writing,
Recording, or Photograph
The Best Evidence Rule is found in Federal Rules of
Evidence 1001 to 1008.30 Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 sets forth
the general Best Evidence Rule: “An original writing, recording,
or photograph is required in order to prove its content unless
these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.”31 Originally
propounded in the pre-photocopy days when scriveners and
scribes made handwritten copies of documents, the Best Evidence
Rule is based upon the “understanding of the central position
that the written word occupies in the law and the knowledge that
‘a slight variation of words may mean a great difference in
rights.’”32 Currently, a proponent seeking to prove the content of
a writing, recording, or photograph can satisfy the Best Evidence
Rule by (1) complying with Rule 1002 by producing the “original”
28. See, e.g., United States v. Pridgen, 518 F.3d 87, 90 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008)
(noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) permits evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement to impeach a witness’s credibility even when the
statements would not have been admissible as substantive evidence).
29. See FED. R. EVID. 613 (providing that extrinsic evidence of a witness’s
prior inconsistent statement may be admissible “if the witness is given an
opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an
opportunity to examine the witness about it”).
30. See FED. R. EVID. 1001–1008 (listing rules regarding the admissibility of
evidence used to establish the contents of an original writing, recording, or
photograph).
31. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
32. Colin Miller, Even Better Than the Real Thing: How Courts Have Been
Anything But Liberal in Finding Genuine Questions Raised as to the
Authenticity of Originals Under Rule 1003, 68 MD. L. REV. 160, 166 (2008)
(quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 231, at 704 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed.
1984)).
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as defined in Rule 1001(d);33 (2) complying with Rule 100334 by
producing a “duplicate” as defined in Rule 1001(e);35
(3) complying with Rule 1004 by proving (a) a valid reason for
nonproduction of the original or (b) that the original “is not
closely related to a controlling issue;”36 or (4) having the opposing
party admit to the content of the original under Rule 1007.37
In some cases, a party will seek to prove the content of a
writing, recording, or photograph that does not contain a
statement, meaning that there is no potential overlap between
the rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule. For
instance, in State v. Churchill,38 a police officer viewed security
camera footage of a van entering and exiting a parking lot
adjacent to a pizza parlor immediately before and after a safe was
cracked in the parlor.39 Thereafter, the police officer testified at
the defendant’s safecracking trial that he arrested the defendant
in a van that looked similar to the van that he saw in the security
footage.40 The Churchill court was forced to address the question
of whether this testimony violated the Best Evidence Rule
because the footage was not produced at trial, and the court’s
analysis had nothing to do with the rule against hearsay because
there was no statement contained in the footage.41
In other cases, however, a party will seek to prove the
content of a writing, recording, or photograph that does contain a
statement, and most federal42 and state43 courts in such cases
33. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(d) (defining “original”).
34. See FED. R. EVID. 1003 (“A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as
the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity
or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.”).
35. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(e) (defining “duplicate” as a “counterpart
produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other
equivalent process or technique that accurately reproduces the original”).
36. FED. R. EVID. 1004.
37. See FED. R. EVID. 1007 (“The proponent may prove the content . . . by
the testimony . . . of the party against whom the evidence is offered.”).
38. No. 01CA14, 2002 WL 598315 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2002).
39. Id. at *2.
40. Id.
41. See id. at *6–7 (rejecting the argument that defense counsel’s failure to
object to testimony that may have violated the Best Evidence Rule justified a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel).
42. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate NonFerrous Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 930, 989 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (“[Because the witness]
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have conflated the rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence
Rule and deemed neither rule applicable if the party is not
seeking to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.
Let us return to the hypothetical with a physical altercation
ensuing between Dan and Vince soon after Ed tells Dan, “Vince is
coming to see you to collect on that drug debt that you owe him.”
Assume that Ed does not verbally make this statement to Dan
but instead sends the statement to Dan in a text message. For
the reasons stated above, Dan could testify about this text
message without implicating the rule against hearsay because his
testimony would be offered to prove that the message placed him
in reasonable apprehension of Vince regardless of whether Ed’s
statement was honest or accurate. Simply put, Dan’s testimony
would not be proving the truth of the matter asserted in the text
message.
Assume, however, that Dan deletes Ed’s text message after
the physical altercation because it mentions a drug debt, which
could lead to Dan being investigated and possibly prosecuted for
drug-related crimes. If Dan wants to testify concerning the text
message to prove reasonable apprehension, there is no hearsay
problem, but is there a Best Evidence problem? As noted, most
courts answer this question in the negative by conflating the rule
against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule and concluding that
“[t]he best evidence rule is not applicable if the writing is not
offered to prove the truth of the matter therein.”44
This juxtaposition is curious because the Best Evidence Rule
makes no mention of “the truth of the matter asserted.” Instead,
Rule 1002 indicates that the Best Evidence Rule is triggered
when a party seeks “to prove [the] content” of a writing, recording
or photograph.”45 For the conflation of the rule against hearsay
and the Best Evidence Rule to be correct, “content” must be

is not testifying to the contents of the writings or the truth of the matter
asserted, hearsay and best evidence objections do not apply.”).
43. See, e.g., State v. Eubanks, 609 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (“The best evidence rule is not applicable if the writing is not offered to
prove the truth of the matter therein.”).
44. Id.
45. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
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analogous to “the truth of the matter asserted.” Such an analogy,
however, does not hold water.
Merriam–Webster states that when the word “content” is
used as a noun, it means “something contained” or “the topics or
matter treated in a written work” such as a “table of contents.”46
In the above example, then, the content of the text message is
Ed’s statement about Vince coming to see Dan to collect the drug
debt. Put another way, the “content” of a writing is “the matter
asserted,” not “the truth of the matter asserted.” For the text
message to have relevance under the Best Evidence Rule, Dan
has to prove that the content of Ed’s statement was a warning
about Vince coming to collect the drug debt because it was this
“matter asserted” that allegedly placed Dan in reasonable
apprehension of Vince. If Ed had instead texted Dan that Vince
was coming over to give Dan a gift or return Dan’s lawnmower,
Ed’s statement would have no relevance because a statement
with this content would not have placed Dan in reasonable
apprehension of Vince.
For similar reasons, in Abulqasim v. Mahmoud,47 discussed
in the introduction, the court was wrong to conclude that the
wife’s testimony about her husband’s “love letter” e-mail to the
wife’s sister fell beyond the scope of the Best Evidence Rule.48 The
wife claimed that the e-mail was relevant because it explained
why she took the couple’s children and returned to the United
States.49 That e-mail, however, was only relevant if the wife
proved that the content of the e-mail was a declaration of love. If
the husband was e-mailing the wife’s sister to set up a surprise
birthday party for his wife, it would have no relevance because it
would not provide a reasonable explanation for the wife leaving.
To date, seemingly only one court has explicitly recognized
this distinction and disentangled the Best Evidence Rule from the
rule against hearsay: the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in
Kroh v. Kroh.50 In Kroh, a husband, Thomas Kroh, brought an
46. MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 269 (11th ed. 2006).
47. 49 A.3d 828 (D.C. 2012).
48. See id. at 837 (“The court exercised reasonable discretion by admitting
the testimony . . . . [T]he best evidence rule did not apply.”).
49. Id.
50. 567 S.E.2d 760 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
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action against his wife, Teresa Kroh, claiming that she had
engaged in illegal wiretapping of his in-home conversations and
actions.51 At trial, the wife sought to testify that she began
wiretapping the husband’s conversations and activities because
she found veterinary reports alleging that the husband had
engaged in acts of bestiality with the family dog.52
The trial court deemed this proposed testimony inadmissible,
and the Court of Appeals of North Carolina later agreed.53 The
appellate court actually agreed with Teresa Kroh that she could
testify concerning the veterinary reports for the non-hearsay
purpose of proving the effect of reading the reports on her state of
mind and the reason why she began wiretapping her husband.54
Nonetheless, the court still deemed Teresa’s testimony
inadmissible because she failed to produce or account for her
nonproduction of the veterinary reports, meaning that she failed
to satisfy the Best Evidence Rule.55 According to the court, the
reports:
[W]ere not relevant to Teresa Kroh’s state of mind except to
the extent that she read them and interpreted them. As she
was offering these reports into evidence to prove their contents
(and how she interpreted those contents, regardless of their
actual truth or falsity), Teresa Kroh was required to produce
the original reports (under Rule 1002) . . . .56

This analysis by the court gets to the heart of the issue. If a
party is seeking to prove a statement’s “effect on the listener,”
there is no problem under the rule against hearsay because the
party can prove this effect without also proving the truth of the
matter asserted. But if a party is seeking to prove a statement’s
“effect on the reader,” there is a potential problem under the Best
Evidence Rule because, to prove that effect, the party must prove
51. Id. at 761.
52. Id. at 764.
53. See id. (concluding that the expert reports were properly excluded
because the expert “failed to properly authenticate the proffered reports”).
54. See id. at 764–65 (suggesting that the reports could have been admitted
into evidence had they been properly admitted under the rules of evidence).
55. See id. at 765 (excluding the report because “Teresa Kroh was required
to produce the original reports . . . and to properly authenticate them” and she
“failed to do so”).
56. Id.
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two things: (1) the content of the statement; and (2) how the
party interpreted that content. Without first proving the content
of the statement, the party’s testimony about how she interpreted
that content has no relevance.
This is the fundamental distinction between the rule against
hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule. A statement offered to prove
something other than the truth of the matter asserted is not
hearsay because there is no point in calling the declarant to the
witness stand as it is irrelevant whether the declarant was being
honest or accurate in making the statement. Conversely, in
Vince’s battery action against Dan, if Dan wants to testify that
Ed sent him a text message warning him about Vince coming to
collect a drug debt, it makes a great deal of sense for the text
message to be admitted as an exhibit to see whether it actually
contained such a warning and thus whether it could have placed
Dan in reasonable apprehension of Vince. If the Best Evidence
Rule did not apply to Dan’s testimony concerning the text
message, the jury would simply have to take Dan at his word that
he indeed received a text message with the claimed content, just
as the jury in Abulqasim had to take the wife at her word that
she read an e-mail in which her husband professed his love for
the wife’s sister.57
In both of these examples, the question is simply whether the
statement, such as a statement with the content claimed by the
party, was made, which, as noted above,58 is not the concern of
the rule against hearsay. Courts conflating the Best Evidence
Rule and the rule against hearsay fail to realize that the Best
Evidence Rule is concerned with the question of whether a
statement was made. Federal Rule of Evidence 1008 details the
respective functions of the judge and the jury in resolving Best
Evidence issues, and the jury is tasked with deciding
“whether . . . an asserted writing, recording, or photograph ever
existed.”59
57. Abulqasim v. Mahmoud, 49 A.3d 828, 837–38 (D.C. 2012) (admitting
the email into evidence “to the extent it explained Mahmoud’s actions” and not
as evidence supporting the truth of the matter asserted).
58. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (distinguishing evidentiary
limitations based on personal knowledge, as opposed to the rule against
hearsay).
59. FED. R. EVID. 1008.
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The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Klopman v. Zurich American
Insurance Co. of Illinois60 both illustrates this point and reveals
the consequence of following the hearsay/Best Evidence
conflation to its logical conclusion. In Klopman, a former tenant
sued Andrew Klopman, his former landlord, for personal injuries
connected to exposure to lead paint at the property the tenant
rented from Klopman.61 Klopman thereafter brought a
declaratory judgment action against Zurich American Insurance
Company of Illinois, seeking a declaration that the insurance
company was obligated to defend and indemnify him in the lead
paint lawsuit pursuant to his insurance policy.62 The insurance
company responded that it never issued such an insurance policy
to Klopman, while Klopman claimed that the insurance policy
was destroyed in a basement flood, meaning that he could testify
about the contents of the policy pursuant to Rule 1004 because it
was destroyed in the absence of bad faith.63 The Fourth Circuit
found that Klopman’s proposed testimony was governed by the
Best Evidence Rule, with the jury tasked under Rule 1008(a) with
deciding whether an insurance policy ever issued.64
It is no surprise that the Fourth Circuit found that the Best
Evidence Rule applied to testimony concerning a contract—the
insurance policy. The Best Evidence Rule can be traced all the
way back to the pre-Roman inhabitants of England, who placed
great importance on ceremony and “viewed written documents
affecting property or contractual rights not as mere indicia of
those rights, but as the rights themselves.”65 Thus, contracts and
documents affecting property rights such as deeds were the
original raison d’etre for the Best Evidence Rule. But, as noted,
words of contract are not hearsay because they have independent

60. 233 F. App’x 256, 256–58 (4th Cir. 2007).
61. Id. at 257.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 257–59.
64. See id. at 258–60 (“[T]he trier of fact determines whether the asserted
original ever existed and whether the other evidence accurately reflects the
original’s content.”).
65. Cynthia A. De Silva, California’s Best Evidence Rule Repeal: Toward a
Greater Appreciation for Secondary Evidence, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 646, 648
(1999).
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legal significance.66 Klopman was merely attempting to prove
that the insurance company agreed to insure his property, which
created a legally enforceable contract, not that it actually planned
to honor the policy when push came to shove.
Thus, for centuries, courts have applied the Best Evidence
Rule to testimony concerning documents—contracts and deeds—
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted without ever
acknowledging their conflation of that Rule with the rule against
hearsay in other opinions. If we take this conflation to its logical
conclusion, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply to contracts
and deeds, a conclusion that would tear the heart—the very heart
that gave life to the Rule—out of Rule 1002.
While courts have not extended the Best Evidence Rule to
this logical conclusion, which is really more of a logical extreme,
they have frequently found that the Rule does not apply to
evidence concerning statements offered to impeach witnesses. For
instance, in State v. Stramiello,67 the defendant appealed his
conviction for simple escape from a work release camp, claiming,
inter alia, that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to
question guards from the camp concerning a letter that the
defendant allegedly used in making his escape.68 At trial, the
defendant had testified “that he was in an amnesic state during
the time he left the [work release] center and thus could not have
the requisite intent to commit the crime of simple escape.”69 In
response, the prosecution called guards to testify that the
defendant showed them a letter from a trade school stating that
the defendant was enrolled in a special class on the night of his
escape.70
Because it turned out that no class was scheduled on the
night of the defendant’s escape, the prosecution’s theory was that
the defendant forged the letter to facilitate his escape. The
prosecution therefore argued to the Supreme Court of Louisiana
that its failure to produce or account for the letter did not trigger
66. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Routt Cnty. v. O’Dell, 920 P.2d 48, 51
(Colo. 1996) (noting that letters “are not ‘documents’ having independent legal
significance such as contracts or deeds”).
67. 392 So. 2d 425 (La. 1980)
68. Id. at 428–29.
69. Id. at 429.
70. Id.
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Best Evidence Rule scrutiny because it was merely using the
letter to impeach the defendant and not to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the letter: that the defendant was enrolled in a
special class.71 The court agreed, concluding that:
The best evidence rule is applicable only when the purpose of
offering evidence of the writing is to establish the truth of
statements contained therein. When evidence is not offered for
the purpose of proving the truth of a writing’s contents, but for
the purpose of impeaching a witness, the rule is not
applicable. . . . In the instant case, the state was not
attempting to prove the truth of the statements contained in
the letter, that is, that defendant was enrolled in a special
class that met on the evening in question. On the contrary, the
state’s theory of the case was that defendant made his escape
by presenting a letter which contained the falsehood that
defendant was enrolled in the special class. The state used the
testimony about the letter to impeach defendant’s claim that
he was in an amnesic state during the time he left the center
and thus could not have the requisite intent to commit the
crime of simple escape. Hence, the best evidence rule is not
applicable here.72

This conclusion once again illustrates the folly of conflating
the rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule. While the
prosecution was not proving the truth of the matter asserted in
the letter, surely it was seeking to prove the matter asserted in
the letter—in other words, the letter’s content. The letter was
only relevant to impeach the defendant if its content contradicted
the content of the defendant’s testimony. In Stramiello, this
meant that the letter was only relevant if its content was a
fabricated message from the trade school falsely asserting that
the defendant was enrolled in a special class. If the letter shown
to guards by the defendant stated that he was having memory
problems, or, indeed, if the letter was a genuine letter from the
trade school that simply had the date of the class wrong, the
letter would not be relevant to impeach the defendant because it
would be consistent with his trial testimony. Simply put, in order
for a party to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent
statement, the party must first prove that the prior statement
was indeed inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony, which
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
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requires proof of the content of the prior statement. Therefore,
when the prior statement is contained in a writing, recording, or
photograph, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy the Best
Evidence Rule.
IV. Conclusion
The rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule cover
similar ground, but they do not cover the same ground. The rule
against hearsay deems hearsay evidence presumptively
inadmissible because of its unreliability, making the rule
inapplicable when reliability is not an issue, such as when a
party does not seek to prove the truth of the matter asserted in a
statement. The Best Evidence Rule deems secondary evidence
concerning the content of a writing, recording, or photograph
presumptively inadmissible because the original is the best
evidence of its own content. This means that the Rule is
inapplicable when a party does not seek to prove the content of a
writing, recording, or photograph, but an original’s content is
different from the truth of the matter asserted in the original.
Content is the matter asserted in a writing, recording, or
photograph, not the truth of that matter asserted. Therefore,
courts conflating the rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence
Rule have fundamentally misunderstood the Best Evidence Rule
and must disentangle that Rule from the rule against hearsay.

